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Abstract
We introduce three different qualifications of the reversal bias in the framework of social
choice correspondences. For each of them, we prove that the Minimax social choice correspon-
dence is immune to it if and only if the number of voters and the number of alternatives satisfy
suitable arithmetical conditions. We prove those facts thanks to a new characterization of the
Minimax social choice correspondence and using a graph theory approach. We discuss the same
issue for the Borda and Copeland social choice correspondences.
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1 Introduction
Consider a committee having h ≥ 2 members who have to select one or more elements within a set
of n ≥ 2 alternatives. Usually, the procedure used to make that choice only depends on committee
members’ preferences on alternatives. We assume that preferences of committee members are
expressed as strict rankings (linear orders) on the set of alternatives, and call preference profile
any list of h preferences, each of them associated with one of the individuals in the committee.
Thus, a procedure to choose, whatever individual preferences are, one or more alternatives as social
outcome can be represented by a social choice correspondence (scc), that is, a function from the
set of preference profiles to the set of nonempty subsets of the set of alternatives.
∗Daniela Bubboloni was partially supported by GNSAGA of INdAM.
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The assessment of different sccs and their comparison is usually based on which properties,
among the ones considered desirable or undesirable under a social choice viewpoint, those sccs
fulfil. Moving from the ideas originally proposed by Saari (1994) and then deepened by Saari and
Barney (2003), we focus here on a quite unpleasant property that a scc may meet and that, in our
opinion, hasn’t deserved the right attention yet.
In order to describe such a property, recall that the reversal of a preference profile is the prefer-
ence profile obtained by it assuming a complete change in each committee member’s mind about her
own ranking of alternatives (that is, the best alternative gets the worst, the second best alternative
gets the second worst, and so on). Assume now that a given scc associates with a certain pref-
erence profile a singleton, that is, it selects a unique alternative. If we next consider the outcome
determined by the reversal of the considered preference profile, we would expect to have something
different from the previous singleton as it seems natural to demand a certain degree of difference
between the outcomes associated with a preference profile and its reversal. As suggested by Saari
and Barney (2003, p.17),
suppose after the winner of an important departmental election was announced, it was discov-
ered that everyone misunderstood the chair’s instructions. When ranking the three candidates,
everyone listed his top, middle, and bottom-ranked candidate in the natural order first, second,
and third. For reasons only the chair understood, he expected the voters to vote in the opposite
way. As such, when tallying the ballots, he treated a first and last listed candidate, respectively,
as the voter’s last and first choice. Imagine the outcry if after retallying the ballots the chair
reported that [...] the same person won.
In other words, common sense suggests that we should express doubts about the quality of a scc
which associates the same singleton both with a preference profile and with its reversal, that is,
which suffers what we are going to call the reversal bias.
Among the classical sccs, such a bias is experienced by the Minimax scc1, that is the scc
which selects those alternatives whose greatest pairwise defeat is minimum. Indeed, assume that
a committee having six members (h = 6) has to select some alternatives within a set of four
alternatives denoted by 1, 2, 3 and 4 (n = 4). Consider then a preference profile represented by the
matrix 

1 1 1 2 3 4
2 3 4 3 4 2
3 4 2 4 2 3
4 2 3 1 1 1


where, for every i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, the i-th column represents the i-th member’s preferences
according to the rule that the higher the alternative is, the better it is. A simple check shows that
the Minimax scc associates both with that preference profile and with its reversal the same set
{1}. On the other hand, if we consider two alternatives only, then the Minimax scc agrees with
the simple majority and it is immediate to verify that it is immune to the reversal bias whatever
the number of committee members is.
For such a reason, we address the problem of finding conditions on the number of individuals
and on the number of alternatives that make the Minimax scc immune to the reversal bias. Our
main result2 is the following theorem.
Theorem A. The Minimax scc is immune to the reversal bias if and only if h ≤ 3 or n ≤ 3 or
(h, n) ∈ {(4, 4), (5, 4), (7, 4), (5, 5)}.
Theorem A shows, in particular, that the Minimax scc does no exhibit the reversal bias not
only when there are two alternatives but also in other cases. Remarkably, that property holds true
1 Also known as Simpson-Kramer or Condorcet scc.
2Theorem A is a rephrase of Theorem 2 for j = 1.
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when alternatives are three, independently on the number of individuals, and when individuals are
three, independently on the number of alternatives.
The proof of Theorem A requires a certain amount of work and the use of language and methods
taken from graph theory3. Indeed, standard social choice theoretical arguments naturally allow to
prove that, for lots of pairs (h, n), the Minimax scc suffers the reversal bias4. On the other hand,
except for the trivial case n = 2, they turn out to be difficult to apply to prove that, for the
remaining pairs, the Minimax scc is immune to the reversal bias. In particular, no simple intuition
indicates how to treat the cases (h, n) ∈ {(4, 4), (5, 4), (7, 4), (5, 5)}. For such a reason, we first
propose a new characterization of the Minimax scc showing that, for every preference profile, an
alternative x is selected by the Minimax scc if and only if, for every majority threshold µ not
exceeding the number of individuals but exceeding half of it, if there is an alternative which is
preferred by at least µ individuals to x, then, for every alternative, there is another one which is
preferred by at least µ individuals to it (Proposition 1). We then associate with each preference
profile p and each majority threshold µ a directed graph Γµ(p), called majority graph, whose vertices
are the alternatives and whose arcs are the µ-majority relations among alternatives (Section 5.2).
By the analysis of connection and acyclicity properties of those graphs, we find out a general
and unified method to approach the proof of Theorem A. That allows, in particular, to avoid the
repetition of similar arguments and the discussion of very long lists of cases and subcases. The
geometric representation of the graph Γµ(p) is also a useful mental guidance in the tricky steps
needed to carry on such an analysis as well as the proof of Theorem A. We emphasise that the
results related to graph theory deal with quite general majority issues so that they are not limited,
in their meaning, to the specific problem considered in the paper. We are confident that those
results could be a smart tool to manage, in the future, many other problems related not only to
the Minimax scc.
We also introduce two weaker versions of reversal bias. Namely, we say that a scc suffers the
reversal bias of type 2 if there exists a preference profile such that the outcomes associated with it
and its reversal are not disjoint and one of the two is a singleton; we say instead that a scc suffers
the reversal bias of type 3 if there exists a preference profile such that the outcomes associated with
it and its reversal are not disjoint and none of the two is the whole set of the alternatives. It is
immediate to observe that the reversal bias (also called reversal bias of type 1) implies the reversal
bias of type 2 which in turn implies the reversal bias of type 3. Using the same tools and techniques
used to prove Theorem A, we get the following results5.
Theorem B. The Minimax scc is immune to the reversal bias of type 2 if and only if h = 2 or
n ≤ 3 or (h, n) = (4, 4).
Theorem C. The Minimax scc is immune to the reversal bias of type 3 if and only if n = 2 or
(h, n) = (3, 3).
We emphasize that there is an interesting link between the different qualifications of reversal
bias above described and the concept of Condorcet loser. Indeed, let C be a scc satisfying the
Condorcet principle, that is, always selecting the Condorcet winner as unique outcome when it
exists. If C is immune to the reversal bias of type 1, then it never selects the Condorcet loser
as unique outcome, that is, C fulfils the weak Condorcet loser property; if C is immune to the
reversal bias of type 2, then it never selects the Condorcet loser, that is, C fulfils the Condorcet
loser property. Thus, since the Minimax scc satisfies the Condorcet principle, Theorems A and
B provide, in particular, conditions on (h, n) that are sufficient to make the Minimax scc satisfy
the weak Condorcet loser property and the Condorcet loser property, respectively. Certainly, as it
3Note that the use of graphs in social choice theory is well established (see, for instance, Laslier (1997)).
4Propositions 23 and 24, which determine a large set of pairs (h, n) for which the Minimax scc suffers the reversal
bias, are based on an intuitive argument which could be carried on without the machinery of graph theory.
5Theorems B and C are rephrases of Theorem 2 for j = 2 and j = 3, respectively.
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is not known whether such conditions are also necessary, determining all the pairs (h, n) making
the Minimax scc satisfy those properties is an interesting problem which, in our opinion, can be
fruitfully attacked using the methods described in this paper. Finally note that, given a scc C
always selecting the Condorcet winner (not necessarily as unique outcome) when it exists, we have
that if C is immune to the reversal bias of type 2, then it fulfils the weak Condorcet loser property;
if C is immune to the reversal bias of type 3, then it never selects the Condorcet loser when the set
of outcomes is different from the whole set of alternatives.
Observe now that, even though the main concepts of our paper are mainly inspired to the
ideas of Saari and Barney (2003), the framework we consider, as well as the terminology we use,
is different from the one used by those authors. Indeed, they deal with election methods, namely,
functions from the set of finite sequences of individual preferences (still called preference profiles) to
the set of complete and transitive relations on the set of alternatives. In that framework, they say
that an election method suffers the reversal bias if it associates the same relation with a preference
profile and its reversal, provided that such a relation is not a complete tie, so that in their paper the
expression reversal bias is used with a different meaning. For every k ≤ n−1, they also introduce the
concept of k-winner reversal bias (called top-winner bias when k = 1), that is that phenomenon that
occurs when an election method associates with a preference profile and its reversal two relations
having the property to have the same k top ranked alternatives6. Anyway, despite the differences,
it is obvious that any result of theirs about the top-winner reversal bias of a certain election method
implies some information about the reversal bias of type 1 for the scc generated by that method
restricting its domain to those sequences of individual preferences having h terms and looking only
at those alternatives that are top ranked. On the other hand, it is clear that none of their theorems
implies a result about the reversal biases of type 2 and 3 as an immediate by-product. In particular,
from Theorem 8 in Saari and Barney (2003), we deduce that the Borda and Copeland sccs are
immune to the reversal bias of type 1, but nothing can be deduced about the other types of reversal
bias. That makes interesting the following result7.
Theorem D. The Borda and Copeland sccs are immune to the reversal bias of type 3.
We conclude with an observation. Recall that a positional method is an election method where
each time an alternative is ranked k-th by one individual it obtains wk points and alternatives are
then ranked according to the final score they get; the vector w = (wk)
n
k=1 ∈ R
n associated with
the method is called its voting vector and is assumed to satisfy the relations w1 ≥ w2 ≥ . . . ≥ wn
and w1 > wn. Assume now that n ≥ 3 and consider a voting vector w such that there exist
k1, k2 ∈ {1, . . . , n} with wk1 + wn−k1 6= wk2 + wn−k2 . Then, from Theorem 1 in Saari and Barney
(2003), we deduce that the scc generated by the positional method associated with w suffers the
reversal bias of type 1, provided that the number h of individuals is large enough. That fact is
remarkable because it implies the existence of many sccs different from the Minimax scc, like
plurality and anti-plurality sccs, which suffer that bias. Certainly, as the considered theorem gives
no information about the exact values of h for which the reversal bias of type 1 really occurs, finding
those values of h is an interesting issue that deserves to be carefully investigated. More generally,
given any classical scc C and any social choice property, one can consider the problem to determine
conditions on the number of individuals and alternatives which are necessary and sufficient to make
C fulfil the property. We believe that investigating those problems is an interesting and promising
research project since, as particularly shown by our results on the reversal bias, comparing different
6Saari (1994) introduces for election methods another interesting concept, called reversal symmetry, which is
related to the ones now discussed. Namely, an election method is said to be reversal symmetric if the outcomes
associated with any preference profile and its reversal are one the reversal of the other. Of course, if an election
method is reversal symmetric it cannot suffer either the reversal bias or the k-winner reversal bias. Reversal symmetry
has been recently studied by Llamazares and Pen˜a (2015) for positional methods and by Bubboloni and Gori (2015)
for social welfare functions with values in the set of linear orders.
7Theorem D is a rephrase of Proposition 3.
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sccs on the basis of their properties cannot ignore how many individuals and alternatives are
involved in the decision process.
2 Preliminary definitions
Let N⋄ = {a ∈ N : a ≥ 2}. From now on, let n, h ∈ N⋄ be fixed, and let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set
of alternatives and H = {1, . . . , h} be the set of individuals.
A preference relation on N is a linear order on N , that is, a complete, transitive and antisym-
metric binary relation on N . The set of linear orders on N is denoted by L(N). Let q ∈ L(N)
be fixed. Given x, y ∈ N , we usually write x ≥q y instead of (x, y) ∈ q, and x >q y instead
of (x, y) ∈ q and x 6= y. The function rankq : N → {1, . . . , n} defined, for every x ∈ N , by
rankq(x) = |{y ∈ N : y >q x}|+ 1 is bijective. We identify q with the function rank
−1
q and denote
it still by q. We also identify q with the column vector [q(1), . . . , q(n)]T . Moreover, we define qr as
the element in L(N) such that, for every x, y ∈ N , (x, y) ∈ qr if and only if (y, x) ∈ q. Of course,
(qr)r = q. For instance, let n = 3 and q ∈ L(N) be such that 2 >q 1 >q 3. Then q(1) = 2, q(2) = 1,
q(3) = 3 and we identify q with [2, 1, 3]T and qr with [3, 1, 2]T .
A preference profile is an element of L(N)h. The set L(N)h is denoted by P . Let p ∈ P
be fixed. Given i ∈ H , the i-th component of p is denoted by pi and represents the preferences
of individual i. The preference profile p can be naturally identified with the matrix whose i-th
column is [pi(1), . . . , pi(n)]
T . Define pr ∈ P as the preference profile such that, for every i ∈ H ,
(pr)i = (pi)
r. Of course, (pr)r = p. We will write the i-th component of pr simply as pri , instead
of (pr)i. Given µ ∈ N ∩ (h/2, h] and x, y ∈ N , we write x >
p
µ y if |{i ∈ H : x >pi y}| ≥ µ. Note
that x >pµ y if and only if y >
pr
µ x. Elements in N ∩ (h/2, h] are called majority thresholds. We call
minimal majority threshold the integer µ0 = ⌈
h+1
2 ⌉. Further details about preference relations and
preference profiles can be found in Bubboloni and Gori (2015).
A social choice correspondence (scc) is a function from P to the set of the nonempty subsets of
N . The set of sccs is denoted by C. Let C ∈ C. We say that C suffers the reversal bias (of type 1)
if, there exists p ∈ P and x ∈ N such that
C(p) = C(pr) = {x};
the reversal bias of type 2 if, there exists p ∈ P such that
|C(p)| = 1 and C(p) ∩ C(pr) 6= ∅;
the reversal bias of type 3 if, there exists p ∈ P such that
|C(p)| < n and C(p) ∩ C(pr) 6= ∅.
Clearly if C ∈ C suffers the reversal bias of type 1, then C suffers also the reversal bias of type 2,
and if C suffers the reversal bias of type 2 then C suffers also the reversal bias of type 3. We define,
for every j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, the sets
C
j = {C ∈ C : C is immune to the reversal bias of type j}.
Note that C3 ⊆ C2 ⊆ C1.
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3 The Minimax scc
In this section we focus on the Minimax scc, denoted by M and defined, for every p ∈ P , by8
M(p) = argmin
x∈N
max
y∈N\{x}
|{i ∈ H : y >pi x}|.
According to the above definition, M(p) is then the set of those alternatives which minimize the
greatest pairwise defeat, with respect to the individual preferences described by p. However, the
outcomes of the Minimax scc admit an alternative interpretation in terms of majority thresholds.
Given µ ∈ N ∩ (h/2, h], define, for every p ∈ P , the set
Dµ(p) = {x ∈ N : ∀y ∈ N, |{i ∈ H : y >pi x}| < µ}.
Thus, an alternative x belongs to Dµ(p) if and only if it cannot be found another alternative which
is preferred to x by at least µ individuals, according to the preference profile p. Note that the set
Dµ(p) corresponds to the set of µ-majority equilibria associated with p as defined by Greenberg
(1979) in the more general setting where individual preferences are represented via complete and
transitive relations. Observe that if µ ≤ µ′, then Dµ(p) ⊆ Dµ′(p) for all p ∈ P . Moreover, as an
immediate consequence of Corollary 3 in Greenberg (1979) and its proof, for every µ ∈ N∩ (h/2, h],
we have that
Dµ(p) 6= ∅ for all p ∈ P if and only if µ >
n− 1
n
h. (1)
Since h ∈ N ∩ (h/2, h] and h > n−1
n
h, it is well defined the Greenberg majority threshold given by
µG = min
{
m ∈ N ∩ (h/2, h] : m >
n− 1
n
h
}
.
For every p ∈ P , we consider the integer
µ(p) = min{µ ∈ N ∩ (h/2, h] : Dµ(p) 6= ∅}.
Note that, since (1) implies DµG(p) 6= ∅, we have that µ(p) is well defined and µ0 ≤ µ(p) ≤ µG.
We can now prove the following proposition.
Proposition 1. For every p ∈ P, M(p) = Dµ(p)(p).
Proof. We show first that M(p) ⊆ Dµ(p)(p) proving that N \ Dµ(p)(p) ⊆ N \ M(p). Let x0 ∈
N \Dµ(p)(p). Then there exists y0 ∈ N \ {x0} such that |{i ∈ H : y0 >pi x0}| ≥ µ(p). Picking now
x1 ∈ Dµ(p)(p), we have that, for every y ∈ N \ {x1}, |{i ∈ H : y >pi x1}| ≤ µ(p)− 1. Thus,
max
y∈N\{x1}
|{i ∈ H : y >pi x1}| ≤ µ(p)− 1 < |{i ∈ H : y0 >pi x0}| ≤ max
y∈N\{x0}
|{i ∈ H : y >pi x0}|,
which says x0 /∈M(p).
We next show that Dµ(p)(p) ⊆M(p). Let x0 ∈ Dµ(p)(p). Then, we have that
max
y∈N\{x0}
|{i ∈ H : y >pi x0}| ≤ µ(p)− 1.
Assume, by contradiction, that there exists x1 ∈ N such that
max
y∈N\{x1}
|{i ∈ H : y >pi x1}| < max
y∈N\{x0}
|{i ∈ H : y >pi x0}|.
8Fishburn (1977) presents the equivalent definition
M(p) = argmax
x∈N
min
y∈N\{x}
|{i ∈ H : x >pi y}|.
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Then x0 6= x1 and, for every y ∈ N \ {x1}, we have |{i ∈ H : y >pi x1}| < µ(p) − 1. If
µ(p)−1 > h/2, that says x1 ∈ Dµ(p)−1(p) = ∅ and the contradiction is found. Assume instead that
µ(p) − 1 ≤ h/2. Then µ(p) = µ0 =
⌈
h+1
2
⌉
≤ h+22 and since |{i ∈ H : x0 >pi x1}| ≤ µ0 − 2, we get
|{i ∈ H : x1 >pi x0}| ≥ h−µ0+2. Now we observe that, due to µ0 ≤
h+2
2 , we have h−µ0+2 ≥ µ0,
against x0 ∈ Dµ0(p).
Define the sets
T1 = {(h, n) ∈ N
2
⋄ : h ≤ 3} ∪ {(h, n) ∈ N
2
⋄ : n ≤ 3} ∪ {(4, 4), (5, 4), (7, 4), (5, 5)},
T2 = {(h, n) ∈ N
2
⋄ : h = 2} ∪ {(h, n) ∈ N
2
⋄ : n ≤ 3} ∪ {(4, 4)},
T3 = {(h, n) ∈ N
2
⋄ : n = 2} ∪ {(3, 3)}.
and note that T3 ( T2 ( T1. We can now state the main result of the paper. Its proof is technical
and will be presented in Section 5. We stress that it relies on Proposition 1 and the use of language
and methods of graph theory (Sections 5.1 and 5.2).
Theorem 2. Let j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Then, M ∈ Cj if and only if (h, n) ∈ Tj.
4 The Borda and Copeland sccs
In this section we show that, differently from the case of the Minimax scc, the analysis of the
reversal bias is easy for the Borda and Copeland sccs. Those sccs are respectively denoted by Bor
and Cop, and defined9, for every p ∈ P , as
Bor(p) = argmax
x∈N
∑h
i=1
(
n− rankpi(x)
)
,
Cop(p) = argmax
x∈N
(
|{y ∈ N : x >pµ0 y}| − |{y ∈ N : y >
p
µ0
x}|
)
.
The following results show that they are immune to the reversal bias of type 3.
Proposition 3. Bor, Cop ∈ C3.
Proof. We start considering the Borda scc. We need to show that, for every p ∈ P , Bor(p) ∩
Bor(pr) 6= ∅ implies Bor(p) = N . Fix then p ∈ P and x0 ∈ N such that x0 ∈ Bor(p) ∩ Bor(p
r).
Let f , g and u be the functions from N to R defined, for every x ∈ N , by
f(x) =
h∑
i=1
(
n− rankpi(x)
)
, g(x) =
h∑
i=1
(
n− rankpr
i
(x)
)
, u(x) =
h∑
i=1
rankpi(x).
Note that
Bor(p) = argmax
x∈N
f(x), Bor(pr) = argmax
x∈N
g(x),
and that, for every x ∈ N , f(x) = hn− u(x) and g(x) = u(x)− h, due to the fact that rankpr (x) =
n+1− rankp(x). Then x0 realises both the minimum and the maximum of u, so that u is constant.
It follows that f is constant too and therefore Bor(p) = N.
9With Borda scc we mean the well-known Borda count. The definition of the Copeland scc can be found, for
instance, in Fishburn (1977).
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We next consider the Copeland scc. We need to show that, for every p ∈ P , Cop(p)∩Cop(pr) 6=
∅ implies Cop(p) = N . Fix then p ∈ P and x0 ∈ N such that x0 ∈ Cop(p) ∩Cop(p
r). Let f and g
be functions from N to R defined, for every x ∈ N , by
f(x) = |{y ∈ N : x >pµ0 y}|−|{y ∈ N : y >
p
µ0
x}|, g(x) = |{y ∈ N : x >p
r
µ0
y}|−|{y ∈ N : y >p
r
µ0
x}|.
Note that
Cop(p) = argmax
x∈N
f(x), Cop(pr) = argmax
x∈N
g(x).
Moreover, since x >pr
i
y is equivalent to y >pi x for all x, y ∈ N and i ∈ H , we have that, for every
x ∈ N , g(x) = −f(x). Then x0 realises both the minimum and the maximum of f . It follows that
f is constant and therefore Cop(p) = N.
Next corollaries show how the results proved about the reversal bias of M , Bor and Cop can be
used to establish conditions on the number of individuals and alternatives that are necessary and
sufficient to have the equalities M = Bor and M = Cop.
Corollary 4. M = Bor if and only if n = 2.
Proof. If n = 2, then we surely have M = Bor. Assume now that n ≥ 3. If (h, n) 6∈ T3, then,
by Theorem 2 and Proposition 3, M 6∈ C3 and Bor ∈ C3 so that M 6= Bor. If (h, n) ∈ T3, then
(h, n) = (3, 3) and we still have M 6= Bor since the two sccs differ, for instance, on the preference
profile
p =

 1 1 22 2 3
3 3 1


Corollary 5. M = Cop if and only if (h, n) ∈ T3.
Proof. If n = 2, then we surely have M = Cop. Assume now that n ≥ 3. If (h, n) 6∈ T3, then,
by Theorem 2 and Proposition 3, M 6∈ C3 and Cop ∈ C3 so that M 6= Cop. If (h, n) ∈ T3, then
(h, n) = (3, 3). Consider p ∈ P . Since both M and Cop are neutral, without loss of generality, we
can assume that p1 = [1, 2, 3]
T . Recalling that both M and Cop satisfy the Condorcet principle,
they surely coincide when a Condorcet winner exists. Thus, we can assume that the alternatives
ranked first are different among themselves. Since both M and Cop are anonymous, we can assume
that p2(1) = 2 and p3(1) = 3. That leaves just four cases to treat. By a case by case computation
on those, it can be finally proved that M = Cop.
5 Proof of Theorem 2
From Proposition 1 we immediately have that Theorem 2 is implied by the following three propo-
sitions. Their tricky proofs, based on graph theory, are presented in the Sections 5.3, 5.4 and
5.5.
Proposition 6. There exist p ∈ P and x ∈ N such that Dµ(p)(p) = Dµ(pr)(p
r) = {x} if and only
if (h, n) ∈ N2⋄ \ T1.
Proposition 7. There exist p ∈ P and x ∈ N such that Dµ(p)(p) = {x} ⊆ Dµ(pr)(p
r) if and only
if (h, n) ∈ N2⋄ \ T2.
Proposition 8. There exists p ∈ P such that Dµ(p)(p) 6= N and Dµ(p)(p) ∩Dµ(pr)(p
r) 6= ∅ if and
only if (h, n) ∈ N2⋄ \ T3.
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5.1 Graphs
In this section, we recall some basic facts and notation from graph theory, which we are going to
use in the sequel10. All the considered graphs are directed. A graph is a pair (V,A), where V is a
nonempty set called vertex set and A is a subset of {(x, y) ∈ V 2 : x 6= y} called arc set. Note that if
Γ = (V,A) is a graph and |V | = 1, then A = ∅. Given two graphs Γ1 = (V1, A1) and Γ2 = (V2, A2),
we say that Γ2 is a subgraph of Γ1 if V2 ⊆ V1 and A2 ⊆ A1. If Γ2 is a subgraph of Γ1, we write
Γ2 ≤ Γ1.
Let now Γ = (V,A) be a graph. Γ is called complete if for every x, y ∈ V with x 6= y, we have
(x, y) ∈ A or (y, x) ∈ A. We say that x ∈ V is maximal [minimal] for Γ if there exists no y ∈ V such
that (y, x) ∈ A [(x, y) ∈ A]. We denote by max(Γ) [min(Γ)] the set of maximal [minimal] vertices
for Γ. Note that those sets may be empty. We say that x ∈ V is a maximum [minimum] of Γ if, for
every y ∈ V \ {x}, we have that (x, y) ∈ A [(y, x) ∈ A]11. We denote by Max(Γ) [Min(Γ)] the set of
maxima [minima] of Γ. We say that x ∈ V is isolated in Γ if, for every y ∈ V \{x}, (x, y), (y, x) 6∈ A.
We denote by I(Γ) the set of the isolated vertices of Γ. It is useful to note that
max(Γ) ∩min(Γ) = I(Γ). (2)
Note also that if x ∈Max(Γ) ∪Min(Γ) and |V | ≥ 2, then x 6∈ I(Γ).
Γ is said to be connected if, for every x, y ∈ V with x 6= y, there exist k ≥ 2 and an ordered
sequence x1, . . . , xk of distinct elements of V such that x1 = x, xk = y, and, for every j ∈ {1, . . . , k−
1}, (xj , xj+1) ∈ A or (xj+1, xj) ∈ A. Note that if Γ has a maximum [minimum], then Γ is connected.
It is well known that there exist a uniquely determined c ∈ N and connected subgraphs Γ1 =
(V1, A1), . . . ,Γc = (Vc, Ac) of Γ such that ∪
c
i=1Vi = V , ∪
c
i=1Ai = A, and for every i, j ∈ {1, . . . , c}
with i 6= j, Vi∩Vj = Ai∩Aj = ∅. Those subgraphs Γ1, . . . ,Γc are called the connected components
of Γ. They are maximal among the connected subgraphs of Γ, that is, if Γ′ ≤ Γ is connected and
Γ′ ≥ Γi for some i ∈ {1, . . . , c}, then Γ
′ = Γi. In particular, for every i ∈ {1, . . . , c}, x ∈ Vi and
y ∈ V \ Vi imply (x, y), (y, x) /∈ A; x, y ∈ Vi and (x, y) ∈ A imply (x, y) ∈ Ai. Note that x ∈ N is
isolated in Γ if and only if the connected component of Γ containing x is ({x},∅). Given l ≥ 2, Γ
is said to be a l-cycle if |V | = l and there exists an ordered sequence x1, . . . , xl of the elements of
V such that, once defined xl+1 = x1, we have that A = {(xj , xj+1) : 1 ≤ j ≤ l}. Γ is said to be
a cycle if it is a l-cycle for some l ≥ 2. Fixed l ≥ 2, Γ is said to be l-cyclic if there exists a l-cycle
Γ1 ≤ Γ, and l-acyclic otherwise. Γ is said to be acyclic if it is l-acyclic for all l ≥ 2. Note that if
|V | = 1, then Γ is acyclic.
5.2 Majority graphs and their properties
Let p ∈ P and µ ∈ N ∩ (h/2, h]. In a natural way, we associate with the relation on N given by
Σµ(p) = {(x, y) ∈ N ×N : x >
p
µ y}, the graph Γµ(p) = (N,Σµ(p)), called the µ-majority graph of
p. Note that, if µ, µ′ ∈ N∩ (h/2, h] with µ′ ≤ µ, then Γµ(p) ≤ Γµ′(p). In particular, Γµ(p) ≤ Γµ0(p)
holds for all µ ∈ N∩ (h/2, h]. The concept of majority graph has been considered by many authors
essentially in relation to the case when h is odd and µ = µ0 =
h+1
2 (see, for instance, Miller (1977)).
For the purpose of our paper that case is interesting because Γh+1
2
(p) is complete (see Lemma 12),
but we are not focussed only on that particular majority graph.
The properties of the relation Σµ(p) translates easily into graph theoretical properties for Γµ(p).
Moreover, considering Γµ(p) we gain the advantage of using concepts like l-acyclicity and connect-
edness which typically belongs to graph theory. That gives very soon a better comprehension of
the sets Dµ(p) and Dµ(p)(p) = M(p).
10All unexplained notation is standard. See, for instance, Diestel (2010).
11Note that if x is a maximum [minimum] of Γ it is not necessarily maximal [minimal] for Γ. In fact, given
Γ = ({1, 2}, {(1, 2), (2, 1)}), we have that 1 and 2 are both a maximum [minimum] but none of them is maximal
[minimal].
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Lemma 9. Let µ ∈ N ∩ (h/2, h] and p ∈ P. Then Dµ(p) = max(Γµ(p)) = min(Γµ(p
r)). Moreover
Dµ(p) ∩Dµ(p
r) = I(Γµ(p)) = I(Γµ(p
r)).
Proof. The equalities Dµ(p) = max(Γµ(p)) = min(Γµ(p
r)) follow from the definitions of Dµ(p) and
pr. As a consequence, since (pr)r = p, we also have Dµ(p
r) = max(Γµ(p
r)) = min(Γµ(p)), so that
(2) completes the proof.
Lemma 10. Let µ ∈ N ∩ (h/2, h] and p ∈ P. Then Γµ(p) is 2-acyclic and Γµ(p) has at most one
maximum. Moreover, if Γµ(p) has a maximum x ∈ N , then Dµ(p) = Max(Γµ(p)) = {x}.
Proof. The 2-acyclicity follows immediately from µ > h/2.
Assume, by contradiction, that there exist distinct x, y ∈ Max(Γµ(p)). Then (x, y) ∈ Σµ(p) and
(y, x) ∈ Σµ(p), so that Γ1 = ({x, y}, {(x, y), (y, x)}) ≤ Γµ(p). Since Γ1 is a 2-cycle, that contradicts
the fact that Γµ(p) is 2-acyclic.
Assume now that there exists x ∈ Max(Γµ(p)) and show that x ∈ max(Γµ(p)) = Dµ(p). By
contradiction, let x 6∈ max(Γ). Then there is y ∈ N such that (y, x) ∈ Σµ(p). Since also (x, y) ∈
Σµ(p), the 2-cycle Γ1 = ({x, y}, {(x, y), (y, x)}) is a subgraph of Γµ(p) and the contradiction is found.
We complete the proof simply noticing that, being x a maximum of Γµ(p), for every y ∈ N \ {x},
we have that (x, y) ∈ Σµ(p) so that y 6∈ max(Γµ(p)).
Lemma 11. Let µ ∈ N ∩ (h/2, h]. Then Γµ(p) is acyclic for all p ∈ P if and only if µ ≥ µG. In
particular Γh(p) is acyclic for all p ∈ P .
Proof. It is an immediate consequence of Proposition 6 and 7 in Bubboloni and Gori (2014).
Lemma 12. If h is odd, then, for every p ∈ P, Γµ0(p) is complete and I(Γµ0(p)) = ∅. Moreover,
if Dµ0(p) 6= ∅ then µ(p) = µ0, Γµ0(p) admits maximum x ∈ N and Dµ0(p) = {x}.
Proof. Let us fix p ∈ P and note that, being h odd, we have µ0 =
h+1
2 . Assume now, by con-
tradiction, that there exist x, y ∈ N with x 6>pµ0 y and y 6>
p
µ0
x. Then, we get the impossible
relation
h = |{i ∈ H : x >pi y}|+ |{i ∈ H : y >pi x}| ≤ µ0 − 1 + µ0 − 1 = 2
(
h+ 1
2
)
− 2 = h− 1.
Thus Γµ0(p) is complete and, as an immediate consequence, I(Γµ0(p)) = ∅.
In order to prove the second part, assume that Dµ0(p) 6= ∅. Then µ(p) ≤ µ0 and so µ(p) = µ0.
Next, pick x ∈ Dµ0(p). Since Γµ0(p) is complete, then we have x >
p
µ0
y for all y ∈ N \ {x}, that is,
x is a maximum in Γµ0(p). Then, by Lemma 10, Dµ0(p) = {x}.
Let us denote by C(Γµ(p)) the set of the connected components of Γµ(p) and define A(Γµ(p)) =
{Γ ∈ C(Γµ(p)) : Γ is acyclic}. We are ready for a key proposition giving a lower bound for |Dµ(p)|
and leading to some interesting consequences.
Proposition 13. Let µ ∈ N ∩ (h/2, h] and p ∈ P. Then
Dµ(p) =
⋃
Γ∈C(Γµ(p))
max(Γ) ⊇
⋃
Γ∈A(Γµ(p))
max(Γ) ⊇ I(Γµ(p)),
and
|Dµ(p)| =
∑
Γ∈C(Γµ(p))
|max(Γ)| ≥ |A(Γµ(p))| ≥ |I(Γµ(p))|.
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Proof. Let Γ = (V,A) ∈ C(Γµ(p)). Then Γ ≤ Γµ(p), so that V ⊆ N and A ⊆ Σµ(p). Since Γ is
a connected component of Γµ(p), we have that, for every x ∈ V and y ∈ N \ V , y 6>
p
µ x. This
immediately gives that each x ∈ max(Γ) belongs to Dµ(p), so that Dµ(p) ⊇
⋃
Γ∈C(Γµ(p))
max(Γ). The
other inclusion is trivial and thus Dµ(p) =
⋃
Γ∈C(Γµ(p))
max(Γ). Since A(Γµ(p)) ⊆ C(Γµ(p)) and, for
every x ∈ I(Γµ(p)), ({x},∅) ∈ A(Γµ(p)), we also get
⋃
Γ∈C(Γµ(p))
max(Γ) ⊇
⋃
Γ∈A(Γµ(p))
max(Γ) ⊇ I(Γµ(p)).
In particular, since there is no overlap between vertices of different connected components, we
deduce |Dµ(p)| =
∑
Γ∈C(Γµ(p))
|max(Γ)|. We complete the proof showing that for every Γ ∈ A(Γµ(p)),
we have max(Γ) 6= ∅. Pick x1 ∈ V . If y 6>
p
µ x1 for all y ∈ V , then we have x1 ∈ max(Γ) and we have
finished. Assume instead there exists x2 ∈ V with x2 >
p
µ x1. Obviously, we have x2 6= x1. Then,
repeat the argument for x2. Since the set N is finite and Γ contains no cycle, in a finite number
k ≤ n of steps, we obtain an element xk ∈ max(Γ).
Corollary 14. Let µ ∈ N ∩ (h/2, h] and p ∈ P . If Γµ(p) admits at least an acyclic connected
component, then µ(p) ≤ µ.
Proof. By Proposition 13, we have |Dµ(p)| ≥ 1, so that Dµ(p) 6= ∅.
Corollary 15. Let µ ∈ N ∩ (h/2, h] and p ∈ P . If Γµ(p) is acyclic and Dµ(p) is a singleton, then
Γµ(p) is connected.
Proof. Since Γµ(p) is acyclic, we have that C(Γµ(p)) = A(Γµ(p)). Then, using Proposition 13, we
get 1 = |Dµ(p)| ≥ |C(Γµ(p))| ≥ 1. That implies |C(Γµ(p))| = 1, that is, Γµ(p) is connected.
Lemma 16. Let p ∈ P such that µ(pr) ≤ µ(p). Then:
(i) Dµ(p)(p) ∩ Dµ(pr)(p
r) ⊆ I(Γµ(p)(p)). In particular, if Γµ(p)(p) is connected, then Dµ(p)(p) ∩
Dµ(pr)(p
r) = ∅.
(ii) If |Dµ(p)(p)| = 1 and Γµ(p)(p) is acyclic, then Dµ(p)(p) ∩Dµ(pr)(p
r) = ∅.
Proof. (i) From µ(pr) ≤ µ(p) we get Dµ(pr)(p
r) ⊆ Dµ(p)(p
r) and thus, by Lemma 9, we deduce
Dµ(p)(p)∩Dµ(pr)(p
r) ⊆ Dµ(p)(p)∩Dµ(p)(p
r) = I(Γµ(p)(p)). If Γµ(p)(p) is connected, then I(Γµ(p)(p))
is empty and thus also Dµ(p)(p) ∩Dµ(pr)(p
r) = ∅.
(ii) By Corollary 15, (i) applies giving Dµ(p)(p) ∩Dµ(pr)(p
r) = ∅.
Corollary 17. Let µ ∈ N ∩ (h/2, h] and p ∈ P . If Γµ(p) is acyclic, then, for every x ∈ N , we do
not have Dµ(p) = Dµ(p
r) = {x}.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that Dµ0(p) = Dµ0(p
r) = {x}, for some x ∈ N . Then, by Lemma
9, we have that x is isolated in Γµ(p). On the other hand, by Corollary 15, Γµ(p) is connected so
that its only vertex is x, against n ≥ 2.
Lemma 18. Let p ∈ P and assume that both Γµ(p)(p) and Γµ(pr)(p
r) admit an acyclic connected
component. Then:
(i) µ(p) = µ(pr).
(ii) If Γµ(p)(p) is connected, then Dµ(p)(p) ∩Dµ(pr)(p
r) = ∅.
(iii) If Γµ(p)(p) is acyclic, then there exists no x ∈ N such that Dµ(p)(p) = Dµ(pr)(p
r) = {x}.
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Proof. (i) The fact that Γµ(p)(p) admits an acyclic connected component implies that also Γµ(p)(p
r)
admits an acyclic connected component and therefore Corollary 14 gives µ(pr) ≤ µ(p). The same
argument applied to Γµ(pr)(p
r) gives µ(p) ≤ µ(pr).
(ii) Assume that Γµ(p)(p) is connected. Since, by (i), we have that µ(p) = µ(p
r), then Lemma
16 applies, giving Dµ(p)(p) ∩Dµ(pr)(p
r) = ∅.
(iii) Let Γµ(p)(p) be acyclic and assume, by contradiction, that there exists x ∈ N such that
Dµ(p)(p) = Dµ(pr)(p
r) = {x}. By Corollary 15, Γµ(p)(p) is connected and thus, by (ii), we have
that Dµ(p)(p) ∩Dµ(pr)(p
r) = ∅, a contradiction.
Lemma 19. If h is odd, then, for every p ∈ P, µ(p) = µ0 and Dµ(p)(p) = Dµ(pr)(p
r) imply
µ(pr) > µ0.
Proof. Let p ∈ P and assume that µ(p) = µ0 and Dµ(p)(p) = Dµ(pr)(p
r). Then Dµ0(p) 6= ∅ and,
using Lemma 12, Γµ(p)(p) has a maximum x ∈ N and Dµ(p)(p) = Dµ(pr)(p
r) = {x}. Assume by
contradiction that µ(pr) = µ0. By Lemma 9, we get that x is isolated in Γµ(p)(p), against the fact
that x is the maximum of Γµ(p)(p).
Corollary 20. Let p ∈ P such that µ(p) = µ0. If Γµ(p)(p) is acyclic, then there exists no x ∈ N
such that Dµ(p)(p) = Dµ(pr)(p
r) = {x}.
Proof. The acyclicity of Γµ(p)(p) implies that of Γµ(p)(p
r), so that, by Corollary 14, we have µ0 ≤
µ(pr) ≤ µ(p) = µ0. It follows that µ(p
r) = µ(p) = µ0 and Corollary 17 applies.
Due to the previous results, it is important to understand which conditions guarantee the acyclic-
ity of Γµ(p)(p). By Lemma 10, we know that, for every µ ∈ N∩ (h/2, h], Γµ(p) is 2-acyclic. Anyway,
it can admit l-cycles for some l ≥ 3. We explore this possibility through Propositions 6 and 7 in
Bubboloni and Gori (2014).
Proposition 21. Let µ ∈ N ∩ (h/2, h] and l ∈ N ∩ [2, n]. Then there exists p ∈ P such that Γµ(p)
is l-cyclic if and only if µ ≤ l−1
l
h.
Proof. Consider µ > l−1
l
h and assume by contradiction that there exists p ∈ P and an l-cycle
Γ ≤ Γµ(p) with vertex set V . Then V ⊆ N and |V | = l ≤ n. Consider the preference profile p
′ on
the set of l alternatives V obtained from p eliminating (if any) those entries in N \V. By Proposition
6 in Bubboloni and Gori (2014), we have that Γµ(p
′) is acyclic, against the fact that Γ ≤ Γµ(p
′).
Let now µ ≤ l−1
l
h and let V ⊆ N with |V | = l. By Proposition 7 in Bubboloni and Gori (2014),
there exists a preference profile p′ on the set of alternatives V such that Γµ(p
′) contains an l-cycle
Γ whose set of vertices is V . Consider a preference profile p on the set of alternatives N, in which
every individual i ∈ H ranks in the first l positions the alternatives in V as p′i and those in N \ V
as she likes. Then Γ ≤ Γµ(p).
Let us consider now
µa = min
{
m ∈ N ∩ (h/2, h] : m >
n− 2
n− 1
h
}
,
and note that µa is well defined because h ∈ N ∩ (h/2, h] and h >
n−2
n−1h. Moreover, we have that
µ0 ≤ µa ≤ µG and, when n ∈ {2, 3}, µa = µ0.
Corollary 22. Let p ∈ P. If µ(p) ≥ µa, then Γµ(p)(p) is acyclic. In particular, for every n ∈ {2, 3},
Γµ(p)(p) is acyclic.
Proof. Consider Γµ(p)(p). It admits no n-cycle, because having such a cycle obviously implies the
contradiction Dµ(p)(p) = ∅. On the other hand, by Proposition 21, it does not have l-cycles
for all l ∈ {2, . . . , n − 1} because µ(p) > n−2
n−1h ≥
l−1
l
h. Finally note that, if n ∈ {2, 3}, then
µ(p) ≥ µ0 = µa.
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Due to the previous result, we call µa the acyclicity threshold.
Proposition 23. If n ≥ 4 and h is odd and such that h ≥ 3(n−1)
n−3 , then there exist p ∈ P such that
Dµ(p)(p) = Dµ(pr)(p
r) = {n}.
Proof. First of all, note that µ0 =
h+1
2 . Define then µ =
h+3
2 = µ0 + 1 and V = N \ {n}. The
assumption h ≥ 3(n−1)
n−3 is equivalent to µ ≤
(n−1)−1
n−1 h and thus, by Proposition 21, there exists
p′, a preference profile on the set of alternatives V, such that Γµ(p
′) has an (n − 1)-cycle Γ. We
define now the preference profile p ∈ P defining, for every i ∈ H , the preference pi as follows. If
i ≤ µ0, then let pi(1) = n and pi(j) = p
′
i(j − 1) for all j ∈ {2, . . . , n}; if µ0 < i ≤ h, then let
pi(j) = p
′
i(j) for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1} and pi(n) = n. Note that in p, the alternative n is ranked
first µ0 times and last h− µ0 times. Thus, n is a maximum in Γµ0(p). By Lemma 12, we then get
µ(p) = µ0 and Dµ(p)(p) = {n}. Moreover Γ ≤ Γµ(p) so that also Γµ(p
r) contains an (n − 1)-cycle
Γr, with inverted orientation, whose vertex set is V . That implies that Dµ0(p
r) = ∅. Indeed, n is
not maximal in Γµ0(p
r), being beaten µ0 times by any other alternative, and each alternative in V
is not maximal in Γµ0(p
r) because, due to the presence of the cycle Γr, it is beaten µ > µ0 times
by a suitable alternative in V . Anyway Dµ(p
r) = {n}, because n is isolated and thus maximal in
Γµ(p
r), by (2); no other alternative is maximal because involved in Γr. It follows that µ(pr) = µ
and Dµ(p)(p) = Dµ(pr)(p
r) = {n}.
Proposition 24. If n ≥ 4 and h is even and such that h ≥ 2(n−1)
n−3 , then there exist p ∈ P such
that Dµ(p)(p) = Dµ(pr)(p
r) = {n}.
Proof. First of all, note that µ0 =
h+2
2 and define V = N \ {n}. The assumption h ≥
2(n−1)
n−3 is
equivalent to µ0 ≤
(n−1)−1
n−1 h and thus, by Proposition 21, there exist a preference profile p
′ on the
set of alternatives V such that Γµ0(p
′) has an (n− 1)-cycle Γ. We define now the preference profile
p ∈ P , defining, for every i ∈ H , the preference pi as follows. If i ≤
h
2 , then let pi(1) = n and
pi(j) = p
′
i(j − 1) for all j ∈ {2, . . . , n}; if
h
2 < i ≤ h, then let pi(j) = p
′
i(j) for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}
and pi(n) = n. Note that in p, the alternative n is ranked first
h
2 times and last
h
2 times. Thus, by
(2), n is isolated and maximal both in Γµ0(p) and in Γµ0(p
r). Moreover, no further alternative is
maximal in Γµ0(p) because each element in V is involved in the cycle Γ ≤ Γµ0(p). Since each cycle
in Γµ0(p) determines a cycle with inverted orientation in Γµ0(p
r), the same consideration holds for
Γµ0(p
r), as well. Then, we conclude that µ(p) = µ(pr) = µ0 and Dµ(p)(p) = Dµ(pr)(p
r) = {n}.
We conclude the section with a further lemma which is useful to manage the case with three
individuals and three alternatives.
Lemma 25. Let (h, n) = (3, 3) and p ∈ P. Then:
(i) the two following conditions are equivalent:
(a) the alternatives ranked first as well as those ranked third in p are distinct;
(b) Γ2(p) is a 3-cycle.
Moreover, if one of the above conditions holds true, then the arc set of Γ3(p) is empty.
(ii) µ(p) = µ(pr).
Proof. (i) We start showing that (a) implies (b). Assume that pi(1) 6= pj(1) and pi(3) 6= pj(3) for
all i, j ∈ H = {1, 2, 3} with i 6= j. Without loss of generality we can assume that p1(1) = 1, p2(1) =
13
2, p3(1) = 3. Thus p1(3) ∈ {2, 3}. If p1(3) = 2, then, since the alternatives ranked third are distinct,
we necessarily have p2(3) = 3 and p3(3) = 1. That implies that
p =

 1 2 33 1 2
2 3 1


Similarly, if p1(3) = 3, we get
p =

 1 2 32 3 1
3 1 2


In both cases we have that Γ2(p) is a 3-cycle and the arc set of Γ3(p) is empty.
We next show that (b) implies (a). Let p ∈ P . If there exists x ∈ N which is ranked first in p
by at least two individuals, then x is a maximum for Γ2(p) and so it cannot be involved in a cycle
of Γ2(p). If there exists x ∈ N which is ranked third in p by at least two individuals, consider p
r.
By what shown above, Γ2(p
r) is acyclic, so that Γ2(p) is acyclic too.
(ii) By contradiction, assume that µ(pr) 6= µ(p), say µ(pr) > µ(p). Then µ(p) = 2 and µ(pr) = 3.
Thus Γ2(p
r) admits a cycle. By Lemma 10, we then get that Γ2(p
r) is a 3-cycle. Using (i) we deduce
that the alternatives ranked first as well as those ranked third in pr are distinct. But then, the
same property holds for p, so that also Γ2(p) is a 3-cycle. Thus D2(p) = ∅, against µ(p) = 2.
5.3 Proof of Proposition 6
First of all, let us prove that if (h, n) ∈ N2⋄ \ T1, then there exist p ∈ P and x ∈ N such that
Dµ(p)(p) = Dµ(pr)(p
r) = {x}. We obtain the proof showing that the assumptions of Propositions
23 or 24 hold true. First of all, note that (h, n) ∈ N2⋄ \ T1 implies h ≥ 4 and n ≥ 4. If n = 4, then
either h is even with h ≥ 6 and so satisfies h ≥ 2(n−1)
n−3 , or h is odd with h ≥ 9 and so satisfies
h ≥ 3(n−1)
n−3 . If n = 5, then the same argument applies. If n ≥ 6, then we have
2(n−1)
n−3 ≤ 4 ≤ h for
all h even, as well as 3(n−1)
n−3 ≤ 5 ≤ h for all h odd.
Assume now that (h, n) ∈ T1 and prove that it cannot be found p ∈ P and x ∈ N such that
Dµ(p)(p) = Dµ(pr)(p
r) = {x}. Consider then (h, n) ∈ T1 and assume, by contradiction, that there
exist p ∈ P and x ∈ N such that Dµ(p)(p) = Dµ(pr)(p
r) = {x}. Since the Minimax scc is neutral,
we can assume that x = n so that
Dµ(p)(p) = Dµ(pr)(p
r) = {n}. (3)
There are several cases to study.
If n ∈ {2, 3}, then, by Corollary 22, we have that Γµ(p)(p) and Γµ(pr)(p
r) are both acyclic so
that Lemma 18 (iii) applies contradicting (3).
If h = 2, then µ(p) = µ(pr) = µa = 2 and, by Corollary 22, we have that Γµ(p)(p) and Γµ(pr)(p
r)
are both acyclic so that Lemma 18 (iii) applies contradicting (3).
If h = 3, then µ0 = 2 and µ(p), µ(p
r) ∈ {2, 3}. If µ(p) = 2, then, by Lemma 19, we have that
µ(pr) = 3 so that Dµ(pr)(p
r) = {n} and Dµ(p)(p
r) = ∅. Let V = N \ {n}. Since n is the only
maximal element in Γµ(pr)(p
r), for every x ∈ V , there exists y ∈ N with y >p
r
µ(pr) x. Note that
if y were equal to n, then from n >p
r
µ(pr) x we would get x >
p
µ(pr) n against the maximality of n
in Γµ(p)(p). Thus, there exists a cycle in Γµ(pr)(p
r) involving some vertices of V. That leads to a
contradiction since, by Lemma 11, Γµ(pr)(p
r) is acyclic. If µ(pr) = 2, then the previous argument
applies to pr. If µ(p) = µ(pr) = 3, then we reach a contradiction applying Lemma 11 and Corollary
17.
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If (h, n) = (4, 4), then µ0 = µa = 3 and µ(p), µ(p
r) ∈ {3, 4}. Thus, by Corollary 22, Γµ(p)(p)
and Γµ(pr)(p
r) are both acyclic, so that Lemma 18 (iii) applies contradicting (3).
If (h, n) = (5, 4), then µ0 = 3, µa = µG = 4, and µ(p), µ(p
r) ∈ {3, 4}. If µ(p) = µ(pr) = 4,
then by Corollary 22, Γµ(p)(p) and Γµ(pr)(p
r) are both acyclic and we contradict (3), using Lemma
18 (iii). If µ(p) = 3 = µ0, then, by Lemma 19, µ(p
r) = 4. By Corollary 22 we have that Γµ(pr)(p
r)
is acyclic and then, by Corollary 15, connected. Assume there exists x ∈ V = {1, 2, 3} such that
4 >p
r
µ(pr) x. Then x >
p
µ(pr) 4, against 4 ∈ Dµ(p)(p). So, we have 4 6>
pr
µ(pr) x, for all x ∈ V . On
the other hand, from 4 ∈ Dµ(pr)(p
r), we deduce that x 6>p
r
µ(pr) 4. Thus, 4 is isolated in Γµ(pr)(p
r),
against the connection of Γµ(pr)(p
r). If µ(pr) = 3 = µ0, then the previous argument applies to p
r.
If (h, n) = (7, 4), then µ0 = 4, µa = 5, µG = 6 and µ(p), µ(p
r) ∈ {4, 5, 6}. If µ(p), µ(pr) ∈ {5, 6},
then by Corollary 22, Γµ(p)(p) and Γµ(pr)(p
r) are both acyclic and we contradict (3), using Lemma
18 (iii). If µ(p) = 4, then, by Lemma 19, µ(pr) ∈ {5, 6}. By Corollary 22, Γµ(pr)(p
r) is acyclic and
then, by Corollary 15, connected. Assume there exists x ∈ V = {1, 2, 3} such that 4 >p
r
µ(pr) x. Then
x >p
µ(pr) 4, against 4 ∈ Dµ(p)(p). So, we have 4 6>
pr
µ(pr) x for all x ∈ V . On the other hand, from
4 ∈ Dµ(pr)(p
r) we deduce that x 6>p
r
µ(pr) 4 for all x ∈ V. Thus, 4 is isolated in Γµ(pr)(p
r), against the
connection of Γµ(pr)(p
r). If µ(pr) = 4, then the previous argument applies to pr.
If (h, n) = (5, 5), then µ0 = 3, µa = 4, µG = 5 and µ(p), µ(p
r) ∈ {3, 4, 5}. If µ(p), µ(pr) ∈ {4, 5},
then by Corollary 22, Γµ(p)(p) and Γµ(pr)(p
r) are both acyclic and we contradict (3), using Lemma
18 (iii). If µ(p) = 3, then, by Lemma 19, µ(pr) ∈ {4, 5}. By Corollary 22, Γµ(pr)(p
r) is acyclic and
then, by Corollary 15, connected. Assume there exists x ∈ V = {1, 2, 3, 4} such that 5 >p
r
µ(pr) x.
Then x >p
µ(pr) 5, against 5 ∈ Dµ(p)(p). On the other hand, from 5 ∈ Dµ(pr)(p
r) we deduce that
x 6>p
r
µ(pr) 5 for all x ∈ V. Thus, 5 is isolated in Γµ(pr)(p
r), against the connection of Γµ(pr)(p
r). If
µ(pr) = 3, then the previous argument applies to pr.
5.4 Proof of Proposition 7
First of all, let us prove that if (h, n) ∈ N2⋄ \T2, then there exists p ∈ P such that Dµ(p)(p) = {1} ⊆
Dµ(pr)(p
r). If (h, n) ∈ N2⋄ \ T1, then we can apply Proposition 6. Assume then that (h, n) ∈ T1 \ T2
and note that
T1 \ T2 = {(h, n) ∈ N
2
⋄ : h = 3, n ≥ 4} ∪ {(5, 4), (5, 5), (7, 4)}.
If (h, n) ∈ N2⋄ is such that h = 3 and n ≥ 4, then consider p ∈ P defined by
p1 = [1, (5), . . . , (n), 2, 3, 4]
T , p2 = [1, (5), . . . , (n), 3, 4, 2]
T , p3 = [4, 2, 3, (n), . . . , (5), 1]
T
Thus, µ(p) = 2 and Dµ(p)(p) = {1}, while µ(p
r) = 3 and Dµ(pr)(p
r) = N.
If (h, n) = (5, 4), then consider p ∈ P defined by

1 1 1 2 3
2 3 4 3 4
3 4 2 4 2
4 2 3 1 1


Thus, µ(p) = 3 and Dµ(p)(p) = {1}, while µ(p
r) = 4 and Dµ(pr)(p
r) = {1, 2, 4}.
If (h, n) = (5, 5), then consider p ∈ P defined by

1 1 1 5 2
2 3 4 2 3
3 4 5 3 4
4 5 2 4 5
5 2 3 1 1


15
Thus, µ(p) = 3 and Dµ(p)(p) = {1}, while µ(p
r) = 4 and Dµ(pr)(p
r) = {1, 5}.
If (h, n) = (7, 4), then consider p ∈ P defined by

1 1 1 1 3 4 2
2 3 4 2 4 2 3
3 4 2 3 2 3 4
4 2 3 4 1 1 1


Thus, µ(p) = 4 and Dµ(p)(p) = {1}, while µ(p
r) = 5 and Dµ(pr)(p
r) = {1, 2, 4}.
Assume now that (h, n) ∈ T2 and prove that it cannot be found p ∈ P and x ∈ N such that
Dµ(p)(p) = {x} ⊆ Dµ(pr)(p
r). By Lemmata 18(i) and 16(ii), it is enough to show that Γµ(p)(p)
and Γµ(pr)(p
r) are both acyclic. This comes applying Corollary 22 in all the possible cases. The
application is obvious when n ∈ {2, 3}; if h = 2 note that µ(p) = µ(pr) = µa = 2; if (h, n) = (4, 4)
note that µ0 = µa = 3 and thus µ(p), µ(p
r) ≥ 3.
5.5 Proof of Proposition 8
First of all, let us prove that if (h, n) ∈ N2⋄ \ T3, then there exists p ∈ P such that Dµ(p)(p) 6= N
and Dµ(p)(p) ∩Dµ(pr)(p
r) 6= ∅. If (h, n) ∈ N2⋄ \ T2 then we can apply Proposition 7. Assume then
that (h, n) ∈ T2 \ T3 and note that
T2 \ T3 = {(h, n) ∈ N
2
⋄ : h = 2, n ≥ 3} ∪ {(h, n) ∈ N
2
⋄ : h 6= 3, n = 3} ∪ {(4, 4)}.
If (h, n) ∈ N2⋄ is such that h = 2 and n ≥ 3, then consider p ∈ P defined by
p1 = [1, 2, 3, . . . , n− 1, n]
T , p2 = [n, 1, 2, . . . , n− 1]
T .
Thus, µ(p) = µ(pr) = 2 and, since n ≥ 3, we have Dµ(p)(p) = {1, n} 6= N . Moreover Dµ(pr)(p
r) =
{n− 1, n}, so that Dµ(p)(p) ∩Dµ(pr)(p
r) = {n}.
If (h, n) ∈ N2⋄ is such that h 6= 3 and n = 3, then consider the partition of N⋄ \ {3} given by
H1 = {h = 2+ 3k : k ≥ 0}, H2 = {h = 1+ 3k : k ≥ 1}, H3 = {h = 3+ 3k : k ≥ 1}. If h ∈ H1, then
consider any p ∈ P such that
|{i ∈ H : pi = [1, 2, 3]
T}| = 1 + k, |{i ∈ H : pi = [3, 1, 2]
T}| = 1 + k,
|{i ∈ H : pi = [2, 3, 1]
T}| = k.
If h ∈ H2, consider any p ∈ P such that
|{i ∈ H : pi = [1, 2, 3]
T}| = k, |{i ∈ H : pi = [2, 3, 1]
T}| = k,
|{i ∈ H : pi = [3, 1, 2]
T}| = k, |{i ∈ H : pi = [1, 3, 2]
T}| = 1.
If h ∈ H3, consider any p ∈ P such that
|{i ∈ H : pi = [1, 2, 3]
T}| = k, |{i ∈ H : pi = [3, 1, 2]
T}| = k,
|{i ∈ H : pi = [2, 3, 1]
T}| = k + 1, |{i ∈ H : pi = [1, 3, 2]
T}| = 2.
In all the above situations, it is easily checked that Dµ(p)(p) = {1, 3} 6= N and Dµ(pr)(p
r) = {2, 3}
so that Dµ(p)(p) ∩Dµ(pr)(p
r) = {3} 6= ∅.
If (h, n) = (4, 4), then consider p ∈ P defined by

1 1 4 4
2 2 2 2
3 3 3 3
4 4 1 1


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Thus µ(p) = µ(pr) = 3, Dµ(p)(p) = {1, 2, 4} 6= N and Dµ(pr)(p
r) = {1, 3, 4}.
Assume now that (h, n) ∈ T3 and prove that it cannot be found p ∈ P such that Dµ(p)(p) 6= N
and Dµ(p)(p) ∩Dµ(pr)(p
r) = ∅.
If n = 2, then the condition Dµ(p)(p) 6= N is equivalent to |Dµ(p)(p)| = 1. Since (h, n) ∈ T2
Proposition 7 applies.
Finally let (h, n) = (3, 3). We show that, for every p ∈ P , we have M(p) ∩M(pr) = ∅ or
M(p) = N . Fix p ∈ P and note that µ0 = 2. Assume first that there exists x ∈ N such that
{i ∈ H : pi(1) = x} has at least two elements. By Lemma 25 (i) and Lemma 10, Γ2(p) is acyclic.
Thus µ(p) = 2 and M(p) = D2(p) = {1}. By Lemma 25 (ii) we also have µ(p
r) = 2. Since in pr the
alternative 1 is beaten by the alternative 2 at least two times, we have that 1 /∈ D2(p
r) = M(pr)
and so M(p) ∩M(pr) = ∅. If there exists x ∈ N such that {i ∈ H : pi(3) = x} has at least two
elements we apply the argument above to pr, obtaining again M(p)∩M(pr) = ∅. We are then left
with assuming that the alternatives ranked first as well as those ranked third are distinct in p. In
this case, by Lemma 25 (i), Γ2(p) is a 3-cycle and µ(p) = 3. Moreover, the arc set of Γ3(p) is empty
so that M(p) = D3(p) = N .
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